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ABSTRACT
When can we reason about the neutrality of a network based
on external observations? We prove conditions under which
it is possible to (a) detect neutrality violations and (b) lo-
calize them to specific links, based on external observations.
Our insight is that, when wemake external observations from
different vantage points, these will most likely be inconsis-
tent with each other if the network is not neutral. Where
existing tomographic techniques try to form solvable sys-
tems of equations to infer network properties, we try to form
unsolvable systems that reveal neutrality violations. We present
an algorithm that relies on this idea to identify sets of non-
neutral links based on external observations, and we show,
through network emulation, that it achieves good accuracy
for a variety of network conditions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network mon-
itoring
Keywords
Network neutrality; network tomography
1. INTRODUCTION
Once a fundamental Internet property, network neutral-
ity cannot be taken for granted today. There is evidence
that Internet service providers (ISPs) differentiate against
certain applications, typically BitTorrent [31], by deprior-
itizing [18], blocking [12], or shaping [11, 16] its traffic.
More recently, there is evidence that ISPs are differentiating
against traffic originating from specific content providers [1].
We are not saying that such differentiation should be illegal
(although it is, in certain countries); our position is that—
whether illegal or not—it should be transparent: if an ISP
differentiates against specific end-hosts, protocols, or appli-
cations, that should be visible to the affected parties and reg-
ulators.
In this paper, we address two questions:
(a) Which neutrality violations can be detected based on
external observations? There exist proposals for detecting
specific kinds of neutrality violation. For instance, several
systems can detect whether a network path differentiates based
on transport- or application-layer information [18, 31, 15,
This work was done at EPFL, when Zhiyong was a visiting PhD
student in the Network Architecture Lab.
11]; however, they cannot detect differentiation based on
source or destination IP address, even though end-users sus-
pect that it does occur [1]. To the best of our knowledge,
there exists no formal definition of which kinds of neutrality
violation are detectable in the first place.
(b) Which neutrality violations can be localized to a spe-
cific link or sequence of links and how? Most existing sys-
tems can detect whether a network path violates neutrality,
but they cannot localize it to a specific link or link sequence.
An exception is NetPolice, which can determine whether a
specific ISP violates neutrality by explicitly measuring the
ISP’s performance for different traffic flows using traceroute
probes [31]. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no
system that can localize a neutrality violation to a specific
link sequence without explicitly measuring its performance.
Our approach is inspired by network performance tomog-
raphy, whose goal is to infer performance properties of links
(loss rate, latency, congestion status, or congestion proba-
bility) based on external observations, i.e., without monitor-
ing these links directly. A tomographic technique typically
forms a system of equations
~y = A  ~x;
where ~y is a given vector of external observations (end-to-
end path measurements), A is a given matrix that specifies
the relationships between links and paths, and ~x is the vector
of link properties that we are trying to infer. It then estimates
~x, either by solving this system of equations (when it has a
unique solution [7, 8, 6, 22, 21, 14]) or by picking a solution
that has some desirable property, e.g., assumes the smallest
number of problematic links [23, 13, 26, 10] or occurs with
the highest probability [22]. This approach fundamentally
relies on the assumption that the network is neutral (each
link treats traffic from all paths the same), otherwise it would
be impossible to express path measurements as a function of
link properties and form a solvable system of equations.
Our insight is that, if the network is not neutral, when we
make external observations from different vantage points,
these will most likely be “inconsistent” with each other, i.e.,
any system of equations that we form based on them will
be unsolvable. So, in a sense, we turn network performance
tomography on its head: where existing tomographic tech-
niques assume network neutrality and try to form solvable
systems of equations to infer network properties, we try to
form unsolvable systems that reveal neutrality violations. By
applying this idea to carefully chosen “slices” of the net-
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work, we can reason not only about the neutrality of the en-
tire network, but also that of link sequences or individual
links.
One challenge in turning this insight into a practical al-
gorithm is that, in practice, a network link that does not ex-
plicitly employ traffic differentiation (hence would be con-
sidered “neutral” by existing neutrality definitions) may be-
have “non-neutrally,” e.g., it may appear to be congested to
one traffic flow but non-congested to another, over the same
time interval. Such network behavior may also lead to in-
consistent external observations, and a naïve application of
our theory would misinterpret these as willful neutrality vio-
lations. We present experimental evidence that we can avoid
such misleading inconsistencies by comparing observations
of similarly sized traffic aggregates.
After describing our terminology and notation (Section 2),
we make the following contribution: we prove conditions
under which a neutrality violation is “observable,” i.e., it
manifests as a set of inconsistent external observations (Sec-
tion 3), and a non-neutral link sequence is “identifiable,” i.e.,
it causes inconsistent external observations that cannot be
attributed to any other link sequence (Section 4). We also
present an algorithm that takes as input a network graph and
external observations, and it identifies all the non-neutral
link sequences that are identifiable (Section 5). Finally, we
present an initial experimental evaluation of our algorithm
on small topologies, based on an open-source network em-
ulator [2], and we show that it achieves good accuracy in
a variety of network conditions (Section 6). We close with
a discussion of open issues (Section 7), related work (Sec-
tion 8), and conclusions (Section 9).
2. SETUP
In this section, we present our goal (Section 2.1), assump-
tions (Section 2.2), and theoretical model (Section 2.3).
2.1 Goal
Our goal is to design an algorithm that takes as input a net-
work graph and external observations (end-to-end measure-
ments), and it identifies non-neutral link sequences. Given
that certain neutrality violations are infeasible to detect (Sec-
tion 3), our algorithm will suffer some false-negatives, but,
ideally, it should not suffer false-positives, i.e., a neutral
link sequence should never be incorrectly identified as non-
neutral.
Neutrality violation is typically informally defined as dif-
ferentiation based on flow type, i.e., the contents of the IP
header, transport-layer header, and/or payload. For example,
a network link may throttle traffic coming from a specific
content provider (based on IP addresses) or from a specific
peer-to-peer (P2P) network (based on port numbers or deep-
packet inspection). When a network link throttles a traffic
flow, it upper-bounds the rate at which the flow can send
traffic, typically below the rate at which the flow generates
traffic; this results in a higher packet-loss rate and/or latency
than the one experienced by unthrottled traffic. So, traffic
differentiation results in different traffic flows experiencing
different performance when traversing the same link(s).
We define “neutrality violation” as the situation where
traffic from two different network paths experiences differ-
ent performance when traversing the same network link (for-
mal definition in Section 2.3). Hence, in our model, a flow
type is represented by a set of paths. For example, suppose a
network link throttles traffic coming from a specific content
provider; we model this by saying that the network has two
“performance classes,” one class comprising all the paths
that start at the content provider, and the other class com-
prising all the other paths. Similarly, suppose a network link
throttles a specific kind of P2P traffic; again, we model this
by saying that the network has two performance classes, one
class comprising all the paths that carry this form of P2P traf-
fic, and the other class comprising all the other paths. We
will discuss the reason behind our choice of definition later
in the paper, once we have presented our model and results.
We do not assume any knowledge on the network’s differ-
entiation criteria, the number of performance classes it dis-
tinguishes, or which network paths belong to the same class.
If one does have such knowledge, it is possible to detect and
localize neutrality violations with a simpler approach than
ours. For example, suppose two parties connected to the
same ISP suspect that the ISP throttles their P2P traffic; to
test this, they can exchange first P2P traffic, then some other
kind of traffic, and compare the achieved performance. On
the other hand, this approach does not work when (a) the
ISP throttles all traffic between the two parties and/or (b) the
two parties communicate over more than one ISPs (in gen-
eral, administrative domains), and any one of them could be
throttling their traffic.
2.2 Assumptions
We make three assumptions:
1. We assume the existence of a measurement platform
and knowledge of the network graph that interconnects
the measurement points. A link in the network graph
may correspond to an IP-level link, a domain-level link,
or, in general, a sequence of consecutive physical links.
2. We assume that the status of each network link is inde-
pendent from the status of any other network link.
3. Theorem 1 (Section 3.3) and Lemma 3 (Section 4.2)
assume that: within any given time interval, if a non-
neutral network link introduces non-negligible packet
loss in its top-priority performance class (formal defi-
nition in Section 2.3), it introduces non-negligible packet
loss in the other performance classes as well.
Assumptions #2 and #3 simplify our analysis and algo-
rithm, but they are not fundamental to our approach; we dis-
cuss how we plan to relax them in Section 7.
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(a) Network graph G.
l1 l2 l3 l4
fp1g 1 1 0 0
fp2g 1 0 1 0
fp3g 0 0 1 1
fp1; p2g 1 1 1 0
fp1; p3g 1 1 1 1
fp2; p3g 1 0 1 1
fp1; p2; p3g 1 1 1 1
(b) A routing matrixA.
Figure 1: Example network with links L = fl1; l2; l3; l4g,
paths P = fp1; p2; p3g, and performance classes C =
ffp1; p3g; fp2gg. Link l1 is non-neutral: it treats traffic
from path p2 worse than traffic from path p1.
2.3 Model
Links and paths.
We represent the network as a tupleG = (V; L; P ). V and
L are, respectively, the nodes and links (edges) of the net-
work graph. We distinguish two kinds of nodes: end-hosts
and relays (the latter corresponding to intermediate elements
like switches or routers). A path is a loop-free sequence of
consecutive links starting and ending at end-hosts, and P is
the set of all the paths in the network that are currently used.
We use l to refer to some link in L, and lk to refer to the k-
th link assuming an arbitrary ordering of all the jLj links. We
use  to refer to a loop-free sequence of consecutive links in
L. We use p to refer to some path in P , and pi to refer to the
i-th path assuming an arbitrary ordering of all the jP j paths.
A pathset is a set of paths, and we denote the set of all
pathsets in the network with P  (the power set of P ). We
use  to refer to some pathset. Given a set of pathsets ,
we use i to refer to the i-th pathset assuming an arbitrary
ordering of all the pathsets in .
We define the following helper functions: Paths(l) is the
set of all paths that traverse link l, Paths() is the set of all
paths that traverse all the links in link sequence , Links(p)
is the set of all links traversed by path p, and Links() is the
set of all links traversed by at least one path in pathset .
We say that link l is distinguishable from link l0, when
Paths(l) 6= Paths(l0).
Performance classes and numbers.
A performance class is a set of paths (that, as we will
see below, are treated the “same” by the network), and we
denote the set of all performance classes by C. We use cn to
refer to the n-th class assuming an arbitrary ordering of all
the jCj classes.
A link is characterized by a set of performance numbers
fx(n) j n = 1::jCjg. When traffic from a path that belongs
to the n-th class traverses this link, it experiences perfor-
mance x(n). We use fxk(n) j n = 1::jCjg to particularly
denote the performance numbers of link lk.
We say that a link is neutral when its performance num-
ber is the same for all performance classes: x(n) = x; 8n =
1::jCj; otherwise, we say that the link is non-neutral. When
there is only one performance class in the network, by defi-
nition, all links are neutral. We use xk to particularly denote
the performance number of neutral link lk. We denote all the
neutral links in the network by Ln, and all the non-neutral
links in the network by Ln. The top-priority class of a non-
neutral link is the class for which the link has the highest
performance.
For example, in Figure 1(a), there are two performance
classes, fp1; p3g and fp2g. Non-neutral link l1 has perfor-
mance numbers fx1(1); x1(2)g, while neutral link l3 has
performance number x3. Traffic traversing l1 experiences
different performance, depending on which path it belongs
to: traffic from path p1 experiences performance x1(1), whereas
traffic from path p2 experiences performance x1(2). In con-
trast, all traffic traversing link l3 experiences the same per-
formance x3.
Similarly, a link sequence is characterized by a set of per-
formance numbers fx^(n) j n = 1::jCjg.
Finally, a pathset  is characterized by a performance num-
ber y. Given a set of pathsets , we use yi to denote the
performance number of pathset i.
Performance metrics.
In our experimental evaluation, we use the performance
metric introduced in [22], which is defined as follows:
. Time is divided into intervals.
.We say that a link, link sequence, or path is congestion-
free during a given time interval, when it introduces (or ex-
periences, in the case of a path) negligible packet loss during
that interval.
. The performance numbers of a link or link sequence
 are fx^(n)  log(P(; cn)) j n = 1::jCjg, where P(; cn)
is the probability that  is congestion-free with respect to
performance class cn during any given time interval.
. The performance number of pathset  is y  log(P()),
where P() is the probability that all the paths in  are congestion-
free during any given time interval.
In general, we can use any metric that is “additive” in the
following sense:
1. The performance of a link sequence  for class cn is
equal to the sum of the performance of its member
links for that class:
x^(n) =
X
k j lk2
xk(n): (1)
For example, in Figure 1(a), link sequence hl1; l3i has
performance numbers fx^(1) = x1(1) + x3; x^(2) =
x1(2) + x3g.
2. In a neutral network, the performance of a pathset 
is equal to the sum of the performance of its member
links:
y =
X
k j lk2Links()
xk: (2)
For example, if the network in Figure 1(a) was neutral,
pathset fp1; p2g would have performance number y =
3
x1 + x2 + x3.
We restrict ourselves to performance metrics that satisfy
both Equations 1 and 2, because we have found that these
reveal the largest number of neutrality violations. Not all
intuitive metrics fall into this category; we discuss how to
address this limitation in Section 7.
Definition of network neutrality.
A neutral link sequence is a sequence of neutral links and
a neutral network is one that has only neutral links. Con-
versely, a non-neutral sequence or network is one that in-
cludes at least one non-neutral link.
Neutrality inference.
The input to our problem consists of: the network G and
the performance number of any pathset  2 P . The desired
output is the set of non-neutral links Ln.
Generalized routing matrix.
A generalized routing matrix represents the relationships
between the links L and a set of pathsets  (Figure 1(b)).
More formally: Given a set of pathsets, a generalized rout-
ing matrixA() is a jj  jLj matrix with
Aik =
8<: 1, if at least one path in pathset itraverses link lk
0, otherwise.
Systems of equations for a neutral network.
Here are some of the equations we could write for the net-
work in Figure 1, if it was neutral:
fp1g : y1 = x1 + x2
fp2g : y2 = x1 + x3
fp1; p2g : y3 = x1 + x2 + x3:
Any such system of equations can be summarized as
~y = A()  ~x; (3)
where ~x = fxk j k = 1::jLjg and ~y = fyi j i = 1::jjg.
When the network is not neutral, the equations in Sys-
tem 3 are incorrect and—as we will see—the system is often
unsolvable. This observation is the cornerstone of our work.
3. NETWORK NON-NEUTRALITY
In this section, we present a condition on the network G
and the location of the non-neutral links Ln, which is nec-
essary and sufficient for observing non-neutrality using our
approach. When a non-neutral network meets this condition,
we can observe that it is non-neutral; when it does not meet
this condition, it appears neutral to our approach. We first
define “observability” (Section 3.1) and the “equivalent neu-
tral network,” the basic construct that we use to formulate
our result (Section 3.2), then state the condition and illus-
trate with examples (Section 3.3). The proof of the theorem
is in the appendix.
3.1 Definition of Observability
LEMMA 1. Consider a network with paths P . If there
exists a set of pathsets   P  such that System 3 does not
have a solution, then the network is non-neutral.
The proof is trivial: When all the links are neutral, the rout-
ing matrix correctly captures the relationships between the
link performance numbers ~x = fxk j k = 1::jLjg and the
external observations ~y, so System 3 has at least one solu-
tion.
Lemma 1 says that, if System 3 has no solution, the only
possible explanation is that the network is non-neutral. For
example, consider the network shown in Figure 1 and the
system of equations
fp1g : y1 = x1 + x2
fp2g : y2 = x1 + x3
fp3g : y3 = x3 + x4:
Suppose we observe that (a) y1 = y3 = 0 (paths p1 and
p3 are always congestion-free), whereas (b) y2 6= 0 (path
p2 is occasionally congested). These two observations are
inconsistent: (a) indicates that xk = 0 for all k (all the links
are always congestion-free), whereas (b) indicates that either
x1 6= 0 or x3 6= 0 (either l1 or l3 is occasionally congested).
The only possible explanation for this inconsistency is that l1
and/or l3 are non-neutral and treat traffic from path p2 worse
than the other traffic.
DEFINITION 1. Consider a non-neutral network with paths
P . We say that the network’s neutrality violation is observ-
able, when there exists a set of pathsets   P  such that
System 3 does not have a solution.
There exist neutrality violations that are not observable
with our approach. For example, consider the network shown
in Figure 2(a), where link l1 is non-neutral, treating traffic
from path p2 worse than traffic from path p1. In this par-
ticular network, there exists no unsolvable System 3. The
intuition is that the worse treatment that l1 inflicts on path
p2 can always be attributed to link l3. As a result, any set
of external observations can be explained through a neutral
behavior of the links, which means that we cannot detect
neutrality violation based on external observations.
3.2 Equivalent Neutral Network
From the point of view of the end-hosts, any non-neutral
network with jLnj neutral links, jLnj non-neutral links, and
jCj performance classes is equivalent to a neutral network
with jLnj + jLnj  jCj (neutral) links; by “equivalent” we
mean that the two networks produce the same external ob-
servations. To generate an equivalent neutral network, we
map each original non-neutral link l into jCj virtual neutral
links, one of them modeling l’s common queue and the rest
of them modeling l’s regulation of the lower-priority classes.
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(b) Neutral equivalent G+.
l1 l2 l3
fp1g 1 1 0
fp2g 1 0 1
(c) A routing matrixA.
l+1 (1) l
+
1 (2) l
+
2 l
+
3
fp1g 1 0 1 0
fp2g 1 1 0 1
(d) A routing matrixA+.
Figure 2: A non-neutral network (and its neutral equiva-
lent) where neutrality violation is non-observable. There
are two performance classes C = ffp1g; fp2gg. Link l1
is non-neutral: it treats traffic from p2 worse than traffic
from p1.
Figure 2 shows an example: in the original network, non-
neutral link l1 has performance numbers x1(1) and x1(2); in
the neutral equivalent, l1 is mapped to two virtual links:
a) Virtual link l+1 (1) models l1’s common queue. It has
performance number x1(1), and it is traversed by both
paths. It captures any bad performance that link l1 may
inflict on p1, which will necessarily also be inflicted on
p2 (since it is lower-priority).
b) Virtual link l+1 (2)models l1’s regulation of performance
class c2. It has performance number x1(2) x1(1), and
it is traversed only by path p2. It captures any extra bad
performance that link l1 may inflict on p2 due its regu-
lation of performance class c2.
An original non-neutral network G = (V; L; P ) and a
neutral equivalent G+ = (V +; L+; P ) are related as fol-
lows:
a) For each neutral link l 2 Ln with performance number
x, there exists a link l+ 2 L+ with the same perfor-
mance number x and Paths(l+) = Paths(l).
b) For each non-neutral link l 2 Ln with performance
numbers fx(n) j n = 1::jCjg and top-priority class cn ,
there exist jCj links fl+(n) j n = 1::jCjg 2 L+, where:
i) l+(n) has performance number x(n)
and Paths(l+(n)) = Paths(l).
ii) l+(n); 8n 6= n has performance number
x(n) x(n) and Paths(l+(n)) = Paths(l)\cn.
As a second example, Figure 3(a) shows the neutral equiv-
alent for the network in Figure 1(a): neutral link l2 is mapped
to virtual link l+2 , while non-neutral link l1 is mapped to
l+1 (1) and l
+
1 (2).
l1
+(2)
l4
+
l2
+
p1
p2 l3
+
p3
l1
+(1)
(a) Neutral equivalent G+.
l+1 (1) l
+
1 (2) l
+
2 l
+
3 l
+
4
fp1g 1 0 1 0 0
fp2g 1 1 0 1 0
fp3g 0 0 0 1 1
fp1; p2g 1 1 1 1 0
fp1; p3g 1 0 1 1 1
fp2; p3g 1 1 0 1 1
fp1; p2; p3g 1 1 1 1 1
(b) A routing matrixA+.
Figure 3: Neutral equivalent for the network shown in
Figure 1.
For any non-neutral network, there exists at least one neu-
tral equivalent and potentially more. A neutral equivalent
may include “loop links,” which start and end at the same
node. For example, consider the network shown in Fig-
ure 4(a), where link l1 and l2 are non-neutral, treating traffic
from path p1 better than traffic from the rest. One of the
neutral equivalents of this network (shown in Figure 4(b))
includes a loop link l+1 (2), which is traversed by p2, p3, and
p4. For this example, if we change the order of l+1 (1) and
l+1 (2), we can get another neutral equivalent without loop
link, shown in Figure 4(c). However, as the original network
becomes larger and more complex, we may not build a loop-
free neutral equivalent. Fortunately, it does not affect our
following analysis.
We use A+ to denote a generalized routing matrix of an
equivalent neutral network. Clearly, even though there might
exist more than one neutral equivalents. The routing matrix
of any pathset in all the neutral equivalents are always iden-
tical. E.g., the neutral equivalents in Figure 4(b) and Fig-
ure 4(c) have the same routing matrix, shown in Figure 4(d).
3.3 Condition for Observability
THEOREM 1. Consider a non-neutral network with links
L, and its equivalent neutral network with links L+. The
network’s neutrality violation is observable, if and only if
there exists at least one virtual link l+(n) 2 L+ that is dis-
tinguishable from any link in L.
We illustrate with three examples:
Non-observable violation.
Consider again the non-neutral network in Figure 2(a) and
its neutral equivalent in Figure 2(b). In this case, none of the
two virtual links in the neutral equivalent satisfies the con-
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(b) Neutral equivalent with a
loop link.
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(c) Neutral equivalent with-
out loop link.
l+1 (1) l
+
1 (2) l
+
2 (1) l
+
2 (2) l
+
3 l
+
4 l
+
5 l
+
6
fp1g 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
fp2g 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
fp3g 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
fp4g 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
(d) A routing matrixA+.
Figure 4: A non-neutral network (and its neutral equiva-
lent) where neutrality violation is observable. There are
two performance classes C = ffp1g; fp2; p3; p4gg, where
fp1g has top-priority. Link l1 and l2 are non-neutral.
dition in Theorem 1: l+1 (1) is indistinguishable from l1, and
l+1 (2) is indistinguishable from l3. Therefore, according to
the theorem, this neutrality violation is not observable. In-
deed, we said earlier that l1’s worse effect on p2 can always
be attributed to l3 (Section 3.1). This is an informal way of
saying that l+1 (2) is indistinguishable from l3. Theorem 1
expresses this insight: if a virtual link l+(n) in the neutral
equivalent is indistinguishable from some other link l0 in the
original network, then the non-neutral behavior captured by
l+(n) can be masked, because its effect can always be at-
tributed to l0.
Observable violation #1.
Consider again the non-neutral network in Figure 1(a) and
its neutral equivalent in Figure 3(a). In this case, virtual link
l+1 (2) is distinguishable from any link in L. Therefore, ac-
cording to the theorem, this neutrality violation is observ-
able. Indeed, we said earlier that l1’s effect on p2 cannot be
attributed to any set of neutral links (Section 3.1). Theorem 1
expresses this insight: if a virtual link l+(n) in the neutral
equivalent is distinguishable from any link in the original
network, then the non-neutral behavior captured by l+(n)
cannot be masked, because it cannot be attributed to any
other link(s).
Observable violation #2.
Consider the non-neutral network in Figure 5(a) and its
neutral equivalent in Figure 5(b). Link l1 introduces conges-
tion into class-2 traffic with probability 0:5, while the rest
of the network is congestion-free. In this case, virtual link
l+1 (2) is distinguishable from any link in L. Therefore, ac-
cording to the theorem, this neutrality violation is observ-
able.
At first, it may seem counter-intuitive that this neutrality
violation is observable, as it looks similar to the one in Fig-
ure 2 (which is not). However, a closer look reveals that, in
this case, there does exist an unsolvable system of equations:
fp1g : y1 = x1 + x2
fp2g : y2 = x1 + x3
fp3g : y3 = x1 + x4
fp2; p3g : y4 = x1 + x3 + x4:
If we monitor this network, we observe that:
y1 = 0 p1 is always congestion-free.
y2 = log(0:5) p2 is congestion-free w.p. 0:5.
y3 = log(0:5) p3 is congestion-free w.p. 0:5.
y4 = log(0:5) fp2; p3g is congestion-free w.p. 0:5.
These observations are inconsistent: (a) y1 indicates that
x1 = x2 = 0, which means that link l1 is always congestion-
free. (b) fy2; y3; y4g form a system with unique solution:
x1 = log(0:5) l1 is congestion-free w.p. 0:5.
x3 = 0 l3 is always congestion-free.
x4 = 0 l4 is always congestion-free.
So, if we observe only path p1, we conclude that link l1 is
always congestion-free, whereas if we observe only paths
fp2; p3g, their congestion can only be attributed to link l1.
The only explanation is that link l1 is non-neutral and treats
traffic from paths fp2, p3g worse than the rest.
As a side-note, this example illustrates the benefit of us-
ing performance metrics that can be defined and measured
for pathsets, not only individual paths: The clue that gives
away l1’s non-neutrality is the fact that p2 and p3 always
experience congestion at the same time; assuming that link
statuses are independent (Section 2.2), this correlation can
only be attributed to non-neutral behavior by l1. This clue
emerges only if we observe p2 and p3 as a pair and mea-
sure the probability that they are both congestion-free. The-
orem 1 guarantees that, as long as there exists a distinguish-
able link l+(n) in the neutral equivalent, we can form an
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l4l2
p1 p2
l3
p3
(a) Original network G.
l1
+
(1)
l2
+
p1
p2
p3
l4
+
l3
+
l1
+(2)
(b) Neutral equivalent G+.
Figure 5: A non-neutral network where neutrality vio-
lation is observable. There are two performance classes
C = ffp1g; fp2; p3gg. Link l1 has performance numbers
fx1(1) = 0; x1(2) = log(0:5)g. The other links have per-
formance numbers x2 = x3 = x4 = 0.
unsolvable system of equations; this system, however, may
include equations on pathsets with more than one path, and
we must be able to define and measure their performance.
4. LINK NON-NEUTRALITY
In this section, we present a condition on the pathsPaths()
that traverse a link sequence , which is sufficient for cor-
rectly inferring ’s neutrality. We first define the “network
slice,” the basic construct that we use to formulate our result
(Section 4.1), then state the condition and illustrate with ex-
amples (Section 4.2). The proofs of the lemmas are in the
appendix.
4.1 Network Slice
Lemma 1 can help us reason not only about the neutrality
of the entire network, but also about the neutrality of link
sequences, even individual links. For example, consider the
network shown in Figure 5(a), where the only link traversed
by multiple paths is l1. If we determine that this network is
non-neutral, then the only possible explanation is that link l1
is non-neutral, as it is the only link that handles traffic from
multiple paths and can differentiate between them.
To reason about the neutrality of a link sequence , we
apply Lemma 1 to a network slice G, chosen such that any
observable neutrality violation of this slice can only be at-
tributed to . More specifically, we form a specialized ver-
sion of System 3:
~y = A()  ~x: (4)
We specify how we form this system in the appendix; here,
we only illustrate by example.
To reason about the neutrality of link l1 in Figure 4(a), we
form System 4 for  = hl1i as follows:
a) We create a special set of pathsets hl1i as follows:
i) We identify all path pairs whose only shared link
is l1: fp1; p4g, fp2; p4g, and fp3; p4g.
p1 p2
p3
p4
l1
l6
l23 l24
l25
(a) Network slice Ghl1i.
fp1g : y1 = x1 + x23
fp2g : y2 = x1 + x24
fp3g : y3 = x1 + x25
fp4g : y4 = x1 + x6
fp1; p4g : y5 = x1 + x23 + x6
fp2; p4g : y6 = x1 + x24 + x6
fp3; p4g : y7 = x1 + x25 + x6:
(b) System 4 for  = hl1i.
Figure 6: A non-neutral network where neutrality viola-
tion is observable. There are two performance classes
C = ffp1g; fp2; p3; p4gg, where fp1g has top-priority.
Link l1 is non-neutral, identifiable. Link l2 is non-
neutral, non-identifiable.
ii) hl1i consists of these path pairs plus their indi-
vidual paths: hl1i = ffp1g; fp2g; fp3g; fp4g;
fp1; p4g; fp2; p4g; fp3; p4gg.
b) We create network slice Ghl1i by abstracting away all
individual links in the network other than l1, as shown
in Figure 6(a).
c) We form the system of equations that corresponds to
generalized routing matrixAhl1i(hl1i), shown in Fig-
ure 6(b).
There are two key points about System 4: First, it typically
consists of a small number of equations, because  tends
to be small (for any link sequence , there are typically few
path pairs whose only common link sequence is ). Sec-
ond, once we have created , the topology of the overall
network becomes irrelevant; the only factors that play a role
in System 4 are the performance numbers of the paths and
path pairs in . This is different from existing tomography
techniques, which typically combine large numbers of path
measurements into a single large system of equations that is
determined by the topology of the entire network.
4.2 Identifiability of Non-neutral Links
LEMMA 2. Consider a link sequence  and its set of path-
sets . If System 4 does not have a solution, then  is non-
neutral.
System 4 is a special version of System 3 where the equa-
tions are picked for their particular relationship to link se-
quence . If System 4 does not have a solution, we al-
ready know from Lemma 1 that the network sliceG is non-
neutral; Lemma 2 tells us that link sequence  in particular
is non-neutral. For example, if the system in Figure 6(b)
does not have a solution, the only possible explanation is
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that link l1 is not neutral. The intuition is related to our dis-
cussion on Observable Violation #2 in Section 3.3: pathsets
fp1g; fp4g; fp1; p4g will yield one estimate for l1’s perfor-
mance; pathsets fp2g, fp4g, fp2; p4g will yield a second es-
timate; these can only be different (and the system in Fig-
ure 6(b) unsolvable), if link l1 treats a subset of the involved
paths differently.
DEFINITION 2. Consider a non-neutral link sequence 
and its set of pathsets. We say that  is identifiable, when
System 4 does not have a solution.
There exist non-neutral links that are non-identifiable. For
example, suppose we want to reason about the neutrality of
link l2 in Figure 4(a). To create hl2i, we first identify every
path pair whose only shared link is l2. There are no such path
pairs, hl2i = ;, and we cannot form System 4 for  = hl2i.
LEMMA 3. Consider a non-neutral link sequence  with
performance numbers fx^(n) j n = 1::jCjg and top-priority
class cn . If the following conditions hold:
 there exist at least two path pairs i; j in 
(9 i; j 2 );
 and a lower-priority class cn (9cn 6=n 2 C);
 such that i is entirely in class cn and j is not
(i  cn; j 6 cn);
then  is identifiable.
Informally, Lemma 3 says that a non-neutral link sequence
is identifiable as long as it is traversed by a sufficiently di-
verse set of paths: We can determine that link sequence 
is non-neutral, when it causes different path pairs in  to
experience inconsistent performance. This is guaranteed to
happen for l1 in Figure 4(a): on the one hand, path pair
fp2; p4g is entirely in performance class c2, hence it will
yield an estimate of l1’s performance from the point of view
of this performance class; on the other hand, path pair fp1; p4g
includes at least one path from performance class c1, hence
it will yield a different estimate of l1’s performance. In con-
trast, there exist no path pairs at all that share only link l2 in
the same figure, hence we cannot identify it as a non-neutral
link.
5. ALGORITHM
We will now present an algorithm that takes as input the
network G and the performance number of any pathset ,
and it outputs a set of non-neutral link sequences n. We
will use three metrics to characterize the quality of the algo-
rithm:
False-negative rate: It is the fraction of non-neutral links
that do not participate in any link sequence present in n.
Algorithm 1 Identification of non-neutral link sequences
Input: The links L and paths P
Output: The set of identif. non-neutral link seqs n
1: n  ;, n  ;
2: for each path pair fpi; pjg 2 P  do
3:  = Links(pi) \ Links(pj)
4: if  =2 n then
5: n  n [ fg;   ;
6: end if
7:    [ ffpig; fpjg; fpi; pjgg
8: end for
9: for each link sequence  2 n do
10: if jj < 5 then
11: n  n n fg
12: end if
13: if system ~y = A()  ~x has no solution then
14: n  n n fg, n  n [ fg
15: end if
16: end for
17: return n
E.g., false-negative rate 10% means that 10% of the non-
neutral links do not participate in any link sequence present
in n.
Granularity is the average size of the link sequences in
n. Smaller granularity indicates higher-quality results. The
ideal is 1, which means that we can localize each observable
neutrality violation to a single link.
False-positive rate: It is the fraction of neutral links that
participate in neutral link sequences incorrectly present in
n. E.g., false-positive rate 10%means that 10% of the neu-
tral links participate in a neutral link sequence that is incor-
rectly in n.
The core of our algorithm is Algorithm 1, which identifies
all the non-neutral link sequences that are identifiable:
 Lines 1–12: We add to set n every link sequence 
for which  contains at least 2 path pairs (which is
equivalent to at least 5 pathsets).
 Lines 13–16: We move to set n any link sequence
 2 n for which System 4 has no solution.
If we assume no measurement errors, Algorithm 1 suffers
0 false-positives and potentially a few false-negatives corre-
sponding to the non-identifiable non-neutral link sequences.
This is because its output consists exactly of all the identi-
fiable non-neutral link sequences: (a) Every link sequence
 2 n is non-neutral. We have picked only link sequences
for which System 4 does not have a solution. According to
Lemma 2, any such link sequence is non-neutral. (b) Every
non-neutral link sequence  =2 n is non-identifiable. We
have discarded only link sequences for which System 4 does
have a solution. By Definition 2, any such link sequence is
non-identifiable.
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For example, consider the network in Figure 4(a), and
suppose both links l1 and l2 are non-neutral. In this case,
there are two non-neutral link sequences that are identifi-
able (hl1i; hl1; l2i) and one non-neutral link sequence that is
not (hl2i). The algorithm correctly identifies the former: At
line 8, n = fhl1i; hl1; l2ig. Link sequence hl2i has not
been added to n, because there exists no path pair such
that Links(pi) \ Links(pj) = fl2g. At line 16, n =
fhl1i; hl1; l2ig, because both hl1i and hl1; l2i allow the for-
mation of an unsolvable System 4. Hence, in this exam-
ple, the algorithm’s false-negative rate is 0 (both non-neutral
links are present in n) and the false-positive rate is also 0.
The granularity is 1:5 (the average length of the identified
non-neutral link sequences), which reflects our uncertainty
about the neutrality of link l2.
After running Algorithm 1, we remove from n all re-
dundant link sequences. For example, suppose we have:
n = fhl1; l2i; hl2; l3i; hl1; l2; l3ig; in this case, hl1; l2; l3i
is redundant, because its presence in n does not add new
information about the neutrality of the network. Formally,
we consider a link sequence  2 n redundant, if and only
if:
9fiji = 1::mg : i 2 n [ n; 8i 2 [1;m]
9i 2 [1;m] : i 2 n
[mi=1 i = :
In words, there exists a set of link sequences fig such that:
all of them are either in n or n, at least one of them is
in n (has been identified as non-neutral), and their union is
equal to .
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe our network emulator
(Section 6.1) and how we process the measurements that
we collect from it (Section 6.2). Then we present experi-
mental results from two small topologies (Section 6.3 and
Section 6.4) and close with take-away points (Section 6.5).
6.1 Network Emulator
We perform our experiments within an open-source net-
work emulator, where end-hosts generate actual TCP traf-
fic and network links implement actual traffic-differentiation
mechanisms. We do not simulate packet loss or queuing de-
lay: traffic experiences actual packet loss and queuing delay
depending on the queuing policies and the level of conges-
tion it encounters in the network. We do not assume noise-
free end-to-end measurements: end-hosts measure the per-
formance of end-to-end paths based on the actual traffic they
exchange.
Our emulator is similar to ModelNet [29], with the differ-
ence that the network is emulated by a user-level process, not
a kernel module. We opted for a user-level implementation,
because we found it easier to debug, and it avoids the over-
head of porting between different operating systems. As in
ModelNet, the role of end-hosts is played by virtual network
interfaces that exchange real traffic. The role of the network
(the relays) is played by a network process that implements
network queues and policies. The size of each queue is set
according to the maximum round-trip time (RTT) experi-
enced by traffic traversing the queue. The only aspect of the
network that is simulated is the propagation delay of links.
We implemented two traffic-differentiation mechanisms
that are deployed in current network devices: policing and
shaping. Both of them limit the fraction of a link’s capacity
that is consumed by a given performance class. Policing re-
lies on a token bucket; the rate at which tokens are added to
the bucket determines the maximum rate of the targeted per-
formance class; the size of the bucket determines the maxi-
mum allowed burst; any excess traffic (that does not fit in the
bucket) is immediately dropped. Shaping is similar, with the
difference that any excess traffic is buffered in a dedicated
queue.
In the experiments presented in this paper, the network ei-
ther is neutral or implements jCj = 2 performance classes.
When we say that a network link “implements policing,” we
mean that it passes all class-2 traffic through one policer,
whose rate varies across experiments from 50% to 20% of
link capacity. When we say that a network link “implements
shaping,” we mean that it passes all class-2 traffic through
one shaper, whose rate R varies across experiments from
50% to 20% of link capacity, while it passes all class-1 traf-
fic through another shaper with rate 1 R. Unless otherwise
stated, link capacity and policing/shaping rate take the de-
fault values shown in Table 1.
In each experiment, the end-hosts generate TCP traffic for
10 minutes. Each pair of communicating end-hosts starts a
number of parallel TCP flows with the transfer size follow-
ing a Pareto distribution; when a TCP flow ends, a new one
starts after an idle time that is governed by an exponential
distribution. We chose this model, because there is evidence
that it captures well the communication between pairs of In-
ternet end-hosts [9], but it is not crucial to our results—it is
just one way of generating dynamic traffic patterns. Across
experiments, we vary the number of parallel flows per path,
as well as the parameters of the Pareto and exponential dis-
tributions (that govern flow size and inter-flow idle time, re-
spectively). Unless otherwise stated, these parameters take
the default values shown in Table 1.
Parameter Value(s)
Bottleneck capacity (Mbps) 100
RTT (ms) 50, 80, 120, 200
Policing/shaping rate (%) 20, 30, 40, 50
Congestion-control algorithm CUBIC, NewReno
Parallel TCP flows per path 1, 12, 15, 20, 70
Mean TCP flow size (Mb) 1, 10, 40, 10000
Mean inter-flow gap (s) 10
Loss threshold (%) 1, 5, 10
Measurement interval (ms) 100, 200, 500
Table 1: Experiment parameters. Default values are in
bold.
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6.2 Measurement Processing
By our definition of neutrality, a neutral link l inflicts con-
gestion on any path p 2 Paths(l) with the same probability.
In practice, we found that this may not hold, because packet
loss is not uniform: if path p2 carries more and/or larger TCP
flows than path p1, the same neutral link l may drop a dif-
ferent fraction of packets from p2 than p1 during each time
interval. As a result, even a neutral link may have different
congestion probabilities for different performance classes.
To account for the above, we normalize our path mea-
surements, such that they refer to traffic aggregates of the
same rate. In particular, when we form System 4 for link
sequence , we create the vector ~y as follows: (a) We dis-
count certain packets from our measurements, such that: in
each time interval, all paths in Paths() appear to have sent
the same number of packets. (b) In each time interval, for
each path p 2 Paths(), we count the fraction of packets
that were lost; if this fraction is below a loss threshold, we
decide that p was congestion-free in this interval. (c) In each
time interval, for each pathset  2 , we decide that  was
congestion-free in this interval, when all its member paths
were congestion-free. (d) We compute P() as the fraction
of intervals in which  was congestion-free. The exact pro-
cess by which we create ~y is stated as Algorithm 2 in the
appendix.
A key step of our algorithm is to determine whether vari-
ous instances of System 4 “have a solution” (line 13 of Al-
gorithm 1). In practice, none of these systems has a per-
fect solution, but some are significantly “more unsolvable”
than others. We decide whether System 4 for link sequence
 “has a solution” as follows: (a) We estimate ’s perfor-
mance number based on each path pair in . We compute
the system’s unsolvability as the absolute difference between
the minimum and the maximum estimate. (b) Based on this
unsolvability, we assign the system to one of two clusters
using standard clustering; we decide that the system “has a
solution,” when it belongs to the low-unsolvability cluster.
6.3 Results: Single Shared Link
We first consider a Dumbbell topology with a single shared
link that (in some experiments) implements traffic differen-
tiation. This could correspond to the scenario in Figure 7(a),
where an ISP throttles all traffic from servers S3 and S4. In
this case, the topology in Figure 7(b) is the network slice that
we need to monitor in order to reason about the neutrality of
the shared link l5.
Experimental setup.
We present nine experiment sets, summarized in Table 2.
We always refer to pathset fp1; p2g as “class c1” and to path-
set fp3; p4g as “class c2.” In experiments where the network
is neutral, c1 and c2 do not constitute, strictly speaking, dif-
ferent performance classes, but we refer to them this way for
simplicity.
In the first three experiment sets, the shared link does
not implement any traffic differentiation. To make things
(a) Network.
l1
l8l7
l6
l5
l4
l3l2
l9
p1
p2
p4
p3
(b) Instantiated slice.
Figure 7: Experiment topology A. In some experiments,
link l5 polices traffic from paths p3 and p4.
Set Link l5 Varying parameter Value(s)behavior c1 c2
1 Neutral Mean flow size (Mb) 1 1, 10, 40, 10000
2 Neutral RTT (ms) 50 50, 80, 120, 200
3 Neutral Congestion control CUBIC CUBIC, NewReno
4 Policing Mean flow size (Mb) 1, 10, 40, 10000
5 Policing RTT (ms) 50, 80, 120, 200
6 Policing Policing rate (%) – 20, 30, 40, 50
7 Shaping Mean flow size (Mb) 1, 10, 40, 10000
8 Shaping RTT (msec) 50, 80, 120, 200
9 Shaping Shaping rate (%) – 20, 30, 40, 50
Table 2: Experiment parameters for topology A.
difficult for our algorithm, we try to create network condi-
tions that could be misinterpreted as non-neutrality. For in-
stance, in experiment set #1, class c1’s average flow size is
1Mb, while class c2’s average flow size varies from 1Mb to
10Gb (a different value per experiment). Similarly, in sets
#2 and #3, the two classes have different RTTs or use differ-
ent congestion-control algorithms. As a result, in several of
these experiments, the two classes exhibit dramatically dif-
ferent behavior, for instance, one class spends significantly
more time in TCP slow start than the other.
In the last six experiment sets, the shared link polices or
shapes the traffic in class c2. Here, the difficult scenarios
for our algorithm are the ones where all the paths carry the
same kind of traffic. In each experiment set, we vary the av-
erage flow size, RTT, or policing/shaping rate of the shared
link across experiments; however, in any single experiment,
class-c1 traffic and class-c2 traffic have the same average
flow size, RTT, and congestion-control algorithm.
Results.
In all these experiments, our algorithm correctly decides
whether the shared link is neutral or not.
Figure 8 shows the external observations for each experi-
ment set. In each graph, the y-axis represents the probability
that a path is congested, while the x-axis represents different
experiments. For each x-axis value (each experiment), there
are four data points, one for each of the four paths in our
topology. For instance, in experiment set #1, when class c2
has mean flow size 40Mb, each of the four paths is congested
with probability 40% (Figure 8(a), third set of bars).
Figure 8 provides insight into how the algorithm works:
When the shared link does not implement traffic differentia-
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(c) Experiment set #3 (neutral)
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(d) Experiment set #4 (policing)
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(e) Experiment set #5 (policing)
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(f) Experiment set #6 (policing)
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(g) Experiment set #7 (shaping)
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(i) Experiment set #9 (shaping)
Figure 8: External observations for neutral and non-neutral network, topology A. Parameters in Table 2.
tion, the 4 paths are congested with the same probability (top
three graphs in Figure 8), which leads to consistent observa-
tions. When the shared link implements policing or shaping,
the two paths in class c2 are congested significantly more
often than the two paths in class c1 (bottom six graphs in
Figure 8), which leads to inconsistent observations. One ex-
ception is that when the shaping rate is 0:5 (first experiment
in Figure 8(i)), in which case, the link throttles both traf-
fic classes at exactly the same rate, and thus the 4 paths are
congested with the same probability.
6.4 Results: Multiple Shared Links
Next, we consider the topology in Figure 9, which has
multiple shared links. Links l5, l14, and l20 implement polic-
ing, while the other links do not implement explicit traffic
differentiation. This could correspond to the scenario where
routers R1 to R5 form the backbone of a tier-1 ISP, while
each of routers R6, R7, R10, R11, and R12 belongs to a dif-
ferent tier-2 ISP or content provider. The tier-1 ISP uses
policing on links l14 and l20 to throttle video or P2P traffic
entering its network from routers l7 and l11, respectively; it
uses policing on link l5 to prevent internal P2P traffic from
overloading its backbone network. We do not intend this
to be a realistic topology, but to create a challenging sce-
nario for our algorithm, with multiple shared links and bot-
tlenecks.
Experimental setup.
We present an experiment where the network differenti-
ates against long flows. There are three types of end-hosts:
dark gray end-hosts with lines exchange short flows, light
gray end-hosts with lines exchange long flows that are po-
liced by links l5, l14, and l20 (this is the class-c2 traffic), and
white end-hosts exchange a mix of short and long flows, but
they do not participate in the measurements (they provide
background traffic). Table 3 shows the exact parameters for
each type.
Results.
In this experiment, our algorithm suffers no false-positives
and no false-negatives (each of the three policing links ap-
pears in at least one link sequence that is classified as non-
neutral). It achieves granularity 2:7.
Figure 10(a) summarizes the actual performance of each
link with respect to each path. These numbers are ground
truth, directly measured by the network; our algorithm does
not use them in any way. For each link, we show two box-
plots: the left one summarizes the link’s actual performance
for class c1, and the right one summarizes its actual perfor-
mance for class c2. To create each boxplot, we measure the
performance of the link with respect to every individual path
traversing the link. For instance, consider link l20: accord-
ing to the figure, this link never introduces congestion into
class-c1 paths (left boxplot), while it introduces congestion
on average 4% of the time into class-c2 paths (right boxplot).
We see that, for links l5, l14, and l20, the two boxplots
are significantly further apart than for the rest of the links.
This validates the basic premise of our model: links im-
plementing traffic differentiation have significantly higher
performance-number variability than the rest of the links.
Figure 10(b) summarizes the performance of different link
sequences as inferred by our algorithm. In this network,
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(a) Actual link performance. For each link, we show two boxplots: the left one summarizes the link’s actual performance for class c1, and the
right one its actual performance for class c2. Links marked with an asterisk implement policing.
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(b) Inferred link-sequence performance. For each link sequence, we show two boxplots: the left one summarizes its inferred performance for
class c1, and the right one its inferred performance for class c2. Link sequences marked with an asterisk include at least one policing link.
Figure 10: Ground truth and algorithm results for topology B. Parameters in Table 3.
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Figure 9: Experiment topology B. Dark gray end-hosts
with lines exchange short flows. Light gray end-hosts
with lines exchange long flows, which are policed by links
l5, l14, and l20. White end-hosts exchange a mix of short
and long flows, but do not participate in the measure-
ments.
End-host group Number and size of parallel TCP flows per path
Dark gray 1 1Mb +1 10Mb +1 40Mb
Light gray 1 10Gb
White 1 1Mb +1 10Mb +1 40Mb +1 10Gb
Table 3: Traffic characteristics for topology B.
there are 28 link sequences with two or more path pairs in
, 16 of them non-neutral and identifiable. For each such
link sequence , we show two boxplots: the left one summa-
rizes ’s inferred performance for class c1, and the right one
summarizes its inferred performance for class c2. To create
each boxplot, we infer ’s performance based on different
path pairs (different subsets of equations of System 4). For
instance, consider link sequence #28 = hl4; l5; l13; l17i: ac-
cording to the figure, if we monitor only path pairs in class
c1, we infer that this link sequence almost never introduces
congestion (left boxplot); if we monitor only path pairs in
class c2, we infer that the same link sequence introduces
congestion on average 2% of the time (right boxplot).
We see that, for the link sequences that include link l5,
l14, or l20, the two boxplots are significantly further apart
than for the rest. This validates the basic premise of our
algorithm: links implementing traffic differentiation result
in significantly more inconsistent external observations than
the rest of the links.
Our algorithm suffers no false-negatives in this experi-
ment, even though it incorrectly classifies non-neutral link
sequences #19, #25, and #26 as neutral. These three link se-
quences do introduce different levels of congestion into the
two performance classes, however, the difference is small
enough to confuse the clustering algorithm. In this particular
experiment, these mistakes do not result in false-negatives,
but they do worsen granularity. For instance, link sequence
#19 = hl18; l14i is incorrectly classified as neutral. This
does not lead to a false-negative, because non-neutral link l14
is included in link sequence #20 = hl18; l14; l6; l3i, which
is correctly classified as non-neutral. However, it worsens
the algorithm’s granularity, because it causes long link se-
quence #20 to remain in n (whereas it would have been
discarded as redundant, had #19 been correctly classified as
non-neutral).
6.5 Conclusions
Our algorithm did not misclassify a neutral link sequence
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as non-neutral in any of our experiments, even when half the
paths traversing that link carried 1Mb flows and the other
half carried 10Gb flows. This is because our performance
metric is robust to TCP dynamics: The performance number
of a path indicates how often it suffers non-negligible packet
loss, not howmuch packet loss it suffers. TCP dynamics may
cause the same link to introduce different amounts of packet
loss during the same time interval; however, when the link
does not explicitly differentiate between the two paths, it is
unlikely to introduce non-negligible packet loss in one path
and not in the other during the same time interval.
Congestion did not interfere with neutrality inference in
any of our experiments. In the experiment on topology B,
there exist both neutral and non-neutral, severely congested
links. For instance, both links l13 and l14 operate close to
capacity; if we look at packet loss and queue occupancy for
these two links over time (Figure 11), there is no clue that l14
applies traffic differentiation while l13 does not. This does
not affect the algorithm, because congestion on its own does
not lead to significantly inconsistent external observations;
only congestion that is preferentially inflicted on some paths
does.
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(b) Link l14 (non-neutral).
Figure 11: Queue occupancy of a neutral and a non-
neutral link from topology B.
A key difference from network tomography is that we
neither target nor require accurate inference of the perfor-
mance of link sequences. For example, link l20 has actual
congestion probabilities 0 and 4% for the two classes (Fig-
ure 10(a)), whereas our algorithm infers that it has conges-
tion probabilities 0 and 2% (Figure 10(b), link sequence #23).
This is because the algorithm infers the link’s congestion
probabilities for normalized traffic aggregates (Section 6.2),
which are conservative estimates of the link’s congestion
probabilities for the two performance classes. Despite this,
our algorithm correctly classifies the link as non-neutral, be-
cause it uses clustering: a link sequence  is classified as
non-neutral as long as its inferred performance numbers (in
this case 0 and 2%) are sufficiently different that  is as-
signed to the high-unsolvability cluster (Section 6.2).
As a side-note, we found that modern TCP variants are
designed to converge with minimal packet loss. This is detri-
mental to tomography algorithms that rely on packet-loss
measurements, e.g., to identify bottleneck links. Our perfor-
mance metric is robust to such cautious congestion control,
because—as mentioned above—it is a function of the fre-
quency, not severity of loss events. Cautious congestion con-
trol may enable all classes to converge with minimal packet
loss; however, when a link implements traffic differentiation,
it necessarily introduces more loss events into deprioritized
traffic than the rest, even if each of these events is not severe.
We close by noting that we repeated our experiments with
all the loss thresholds and measurement intervals stated in
Table 1, and there was no significant change in the results.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss open issues.
Measurement platform.
We assume the existence of a measurement platform and
knowledge of the network graph that interconnects the mea-
surement points. The most realistic deployment option is to
use an existing platform where coalitions of end-hosts peri-
odically measure the performance of the paths between them
and upload the results to a centralized location for process-
ing [4, 3, 24].
To discover the network topology, we can leverage exist-
ing work like Rocketfuel [27], AS-level traceroute [20], and
manually collected ISP topologies [5]. Many of these pro-
posals rely on IP traceroute, and one may ask: if we can
use traceroute for discovering topology, why not use it also
for measuring link or ISP performance (Section 1)? One
reason is that a link can treat traceroute probes differently
from other traffic (purposefully or not). That said, when we
do deploy our algorithm, we will have to compare it against
probe-based algorithms [19, 31].
Another challenge is collecting (performance and topol-
ogy) measurements from sufficiently diverse vantage points:
Today, the end-hosts that participate in measurement plat-
forms are typically located in University or residential net-
works. By measuring the performance of the one-way paths
between these end-hosts, one can detect neutrality violations
against P2P traffic [15, 11] or against particular end-hosts.
However, if we want to detect neutrality violations against a
content provider, we also need to know the performance and
topology of the one-way paths from this provider to various
end-hosts (which we cannot measure directly, assuming the
provider does not participate in the measurement platform).
One option we are exploring is to infer the performance of
one-way paths from round-trip performance based on TCP
semantics [25], and to infer the topology of the one-way
paths using reverse traceroute [17].
Link independence.
We assume that the status of each link is independent from
the status of any other link. This simplifies our analysis and
algorithm, because it allows us to express joint probabilities
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as products of marginal probabilities (thus create our simple
linear equations). We can relax this assumption at least in
the following way: we can assume that the status of each
link is independent from the status of any other link that be-
longs to a different administrative domain. This will change
how we create System 3 and network slices, but there exists
work (on applying tomography to correlated links [14]) that
we can leverage to do so. Lemmas 1 and 2 will remain the
same. Theorem 1 will change to refer to distinguishable sets
of links (as opposed to distinguishable links); the proof will
rely on the theory developed in [14] (as opposed to [22]).
Correlated performance classes.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 assume that: within any given
time interval, if a non-neutral link introduces non-negligible
packet loss in its top-priority class, it introduces non-negligible
packet loss in the other classes as well. This assumption sim-
plifies the definition of the equivalent neutral network, but it
does not hold when a non-neutral link uses separate queues
for different performance classes. Removing it will not af-
fect our algorithm, but it will require certain theory changes.
For instance, in the definition of the equivalent neutral net-
work, we will have to distinguish two types of non-neutral
links: (a) Those where performance numbers for different
classes are correlated as in the assumption; a link that po-
lices lower-priority classes would fall into this category. (b)
Those where performance numbers for different classes are
not correlated; a link that uses separate queues for different
performance classes would fall into this category. Each non-
neutral link of type (a) will be mapped to a set of virtual links
as described in Section 3.2. Each non-neutral link of type (b)
will be mapped to a set of parallel virtual links (to model the
fact that the performance numbers for different classes are
not correlated).
Path versus flow differentiation.
We define a non-neutral link as one that differentiates be-
tween traffic from different paths, as opposed to one that dif-
ferentiates by traffic type (which is the typical definition).
What happens when the network does differentiate by traffic
type, e.g., throttles BitTorrent traffic?
In a realistic scenario, we expect our algorithm to detect
differentiation by traffic type without requiring any changes.
Consider a scenario where each path carries a mix of traffic
types, but different paths carry different mixes. For instance,
any path from a content provider to an end-host carries only
non-BitTorrent traffic, whereas any path between two end-
hosts carries both BitTorrent and non-BitTorrent traffic at
different points in time. In this case, any link that differ-
entiates against BitTorrent traffic also differentiates against
paths that carry BitTorrent traffic (e.g., it drops packets from
the these paths more often than from the rest); hence, differ-
entiation by type results into differentiation by path, which
is what our algorithm detects.
In the worst-case scenario, each path carries roughly the
same mix of traffic types all the time. To deal with this case,
we need to redefine a non-neutral link as one that differenti-
ates between different traffic aggregates that follow the same
path. This change of definition affects only the way we col-
lect our external observations: in System 3, each element
of the vector ~y corresponds to a different set of traffic ag-
gregates (as opposed to a different pathset). We can create
traffic aggregates as follows: for each path, we measure the
end-to-end performance experienced by each UDP or TCP
flow, and we classify flows that experience the same perfor-
mance in every time interval into the same traffic aggregate.
Performance metrics.
We restrict ourselves to additive performance metrics that
can be defined not only for paths, but also for pathsets. What
happens when the network violates neutrality, but that results
in inconsistent latency or jitter—in general, performance met-
rics that cannot be defined for pathsets?
A promising approach is to convert our desired perfor-
mance metric into one that can be defined for pathsets. For
instance, if we want to detect neutrality violations that result
in inconsistent latency, we can define a link’s performance as
the probability that the link introduces latency below some
pre-configured threshold; then we can define a pathset’s per-
formance as the probability that all the links traversed by the
pathset introduce latency below some pre-configured thresh-
old.
Defining performance as a probability of a congestion event
means that our external observations are measurements of
the frequency with which paths and pathsets are congested.
The limitation of our approach is that we cannot detect a neu-
trality violation if it lasts for one (in practice, a small number
of) measurement interval(s). However, our detection is not
probabilistic: as long as a neutrality violation lasts for a sig-
nificant number of intervals (and it is externally observable),
our approach can detect it.
8. RELATEDWORK
Several proposals detect traffic differentiation based on
transport-layer headers or payload [18, 31, 15, 11]. The
common theme of these proposals is to have two end-hosts
exchange two different traffic flows (e.g., a BitTorrent flow
and a flow that contains random bytes) over the same net-
work path; if the treatment of the two flows is significantly
different, then the network path between end-user and mon-
itoring server must be non-neutral. Unlike our algorithms,
these systems were not designed to detect traffic differenti-
ation that affects all flows of an end-host, nor localize it to
specific links.
NetPolice [31] belongs to the above body of work, but
moreover detects whether an ISP treats traffic differently based
on routing information, e.g., previous- or next-hop AS. The
main idea is to use traceroute-like probes to measure the loss
rate inflicted by an ISP on traffic associated with different
neighboring ASes; if these loss rates are significantly dif-
ferent from each other, then the ISP must be non-neutral.
We focus, instead, on the scenario where we cannot rely on
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traceroute-like probes (or any other mechanism) to directly
measure the loss rates of links or link sequences (e.g., be-
cause there is no practical way of generating such probes, or
probes are not treated the same as other traffic).
Nano [28] “detects whether an ISP causes performance
degradation for a service when compared to performance for
the same service through other ISPs.” We view this work and
ours as complementary: it detects whether two different ISPs
inflict different performance on the same kind of traffic; we
detect whether any particular link (or link sequence) inflicts
different performance on different traffic.
ShaperProbe [16] and Packsen [30] detect whether a net-
work path is shaping an end-user’s traffic and also determine
the parameters of the shaper. The main idea is to have the
end-user send traffic to a monitoring server, while keeping
track of the rate at which the server receives the user’s traffic;
the evolution of the receiving rate can reveal the presence of
a shaper between end-user and server, as well as the shaper’s
properties. We view this work and ours as complementary: it
detects whether any single flow is subjected to shaping and
identifies the parameters of the shaper; we detect whether
different traffic flows are subjected to different treatment (of
any kind) and localize this differentiation to specific links.
9. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of detecting network-neutrality
violations and localizing them to specific links. We pre-
sented conditions under which neutrality violations are ob-
servable and non-neutral links are identifiable based solely
on external observations. Based on our analysis, we pro-
posed an algorithm that takes as input a network graph and
end-to-end measurements, and it identifies non-neutral link
sequences; we evaluated it using network emulation. Our
results indicate that it is indeed possible to reason about net-
work neutrality, even when we know nothing about the in-
ternal behavior of the network. We hope that this work is a
small step toward making the Internet more transparent.
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APPENDIX A
Symbol Meaning
G = (V; L) The network graph, with nodes V and links L.
Ln The set of all neutral links in L.
Ln The set of all non-neutral links in L.
P The set of all paths.
 An arbitrary set of pathsets.
C The set of all performance classes.
l An arbitrary link in L.
lk The k-th link, assuming an arbitrary
ordering of the jLj links.
 An arbitrary loop-free sequence of links in L.
p An arbitrary path in P .
 An arbitrary pathset (set of paths) in P .
i The i-th pathset from a set ,
assuming an arbitrary ordering.
cn The n-th class, assuming an arbitrary
ordering of the jCj classes.
Paths(l) The set of paths that traverse link l.
Links(p) The set of links traversed by path p.
Links() The set of links traversed by at least one path
from pathset .
x The performance number of an arbitrary
neutral link.
xk The performance number of neutral link lk .
~x The vector fxk j k = 1::jLjg.
x(n) The performance number of an arbitrary
non-neutral link for performance class cn.
xk(n) The performance number of non-neutral link
lk for performance class cn.
x^(n) The performance number of an arbitrary
link sequence for performance class cn.
y The performance number of an arbitrary pathset.
yi The performance number of pathset i.
~y The vector fyi j i = 1::jjg.
A() The generalized routing matrix that consists
of equations for all the pathsets in .
P(l) The probability that neutral link l
introduces negligible packet loss
during any given time interval.
P(l; cn) The probability that non-neutral link l
introduces negligible packet loss into cn-traffic
during any given time interval.
P(; cn) The probability that link sequence 
introduces negligible packet loss into cn-traffic
during any given time interval.
P() The probability that all paths in 
experience negligible packet loss
during any given time interval.
Table 4: Symbols defined in Section 2.3.
Algorithm 2 Computation of pathset performance numbers
Input: M [t][p], the set of packets sent in interval t by path p
Input: L[t][p], the subset of packets inM [t][p] that were lost
Output: yi, the performance number of pathset i 2 
1: for each interval t = 1::T do
2: m inf
3: for each path p 2 Paths() do
4: if jM [t][p]j < m then
5: m jM [t][p]j
6: end if
7: end for
8: for each path p 2 Paths() do
9: M [t][p]  f m random packets fromM [t][p] g
10: L[t][p]  L[t][p] \M [t][p]
11: if jL[t][p]j < 0:01 m then
12: S[t][fpg]  1
13: else
14: S[t][fpg]  0
15: end if
16: end for
17: for each path pair fpi; pjg 2  do
18: S[t][fpi; pjg]  S[t][fpig] ^ S[t][fpjg]
19: end for
20: end for
21: for each pathset i 2  do
22: yi  
P
t S[t][i]
T
23: end for
24: return fyi j i 2 g
APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 1
The following result will be useful to prove Theorem 1.
LEMMA 4. Given a network G with L and P , if all links
in L are distinguishable from each other, then A(P ) has
full column rank.
PROOF. In order to showA(P ) has full column rank, all
we need to prove is: 8~x and ~x0, if
A(P )  ~x = A(P )  ~x0; (5)
then ~x = ~x0. Clearly, the result is independent on the specific
type of performance metrics, so we prove it based on the
probability of congestion-free defined in Section 2.3. (I.e.,
~x = fxk j k = 1::jLjg and xk  log(P(lk)), where P(lk) is
the probability that lk is congestion free.)
We use a boolean random variable Yi to represent the sta-
tus of pi 2 P . If pi is congested, Yi = 1; otherwise, Yi = 0.
For any  2 P , let ~Y() = fYijpi 2 g denote the status
of all the paths in .
Given a specific path state vector ~y 2 f0; 1gjP j1, denote
the corresponding set of good and bad paths by PG and PB
respectively. Let j~yj = jPB j denote the Hamming weight of
~y. Given ~x, the probability that the path state is ~y is denoted
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by P~x(~Y(P ) = ~y).
We first prove, 8~x and ~x0, if (5) holds, then we have
P~x(~Y(P ) = ~y) = P~x0(~Y(P ) = ~y) (6)
for any~y 2 f0; 1gjP j1, by induction on the Hamming weight
of ~y.
Step 1: When j~yj = 0, i.e., ~y = 0, we have
P~x(~Y(P ) = 0) =
jLjY
k=1
(1  P(lk))
= exp
0@ jLjX
k=1
log(1  P(lk))
1A
= exp(A(fPg)  ~x);
where A(fPg) = 1 is a row of A(P ). Therefore, 8~x and
~x0, equation (5) implies
P~x(~Y(P ) = 0) = P~x0(~Y(P ) = 0):
Step 2: We prove the conclusion for any ~y such that 1 
j~yj  jP j   1. Suppose that for any ~y0 such that 0  j~y0j <
j~yj, equation (5) implies P~x(~Y(P ) = ~y0) = P~x0(~Y(P ) = ~y0).
According to the relationship between the joint probability
and the marginal probability, we have
P~x(~Y(P ) = ~y)
= P~x(~Y(PG) = 0; ~Y(PB) = 1)
= P~x(~Y(PG) = 0)  X
;PB
P~x(~Y(PG [ ) = 0; ~Y(PB n ) = 1):
(7)
On the right hand side of (7), P~x(~Y(PG) = 0) = exp(A(fPGg)
~x). A(fPGg) is a row ofA(P ), so equation (5) implies
P~x(~Y(PG) = 0) = P~x0(~Y(PG) = 0): (8)
P~x(~Y(PG [ ) = 0; ~Y(PB n ) = 1) can be expressed as
P~x(~Y(P ) = ~y0), where~y0(PG [ ) = 0,~y0(PB n ) = 1. As
;    PB , j~y0j = jPB nj = jPB j  jj < j~yj. According
to the induction assumption, equation (5) implies
P~x(~Y(PG [ ) = 0; ~Y(PB n ) = 1)
= P~x0(~Y(PG [ ) = 0; ~Y(PB n ) = 1);
(9)
Combining (7), (8) and (9), we have the conclusion when
1  j~yj  jP j   1.
Step 3: When j~yj = jP j, i.e., ~y = 1, P~x(~y = 1) =
1  P~y0<jP j P~x(~Y = ~y0). According to step 1 and 2, (6)
holds for j~yj = jP j.
In [22], the authors have proved that “P~x(~Y = ~y) =
P~x0(~Y = ~y) for any snapshot ~y always implies that ~x =
~x0”. Therefore, 8~x and ~x0, equation (5) always implies that
~x = ~x0, i.e., ~x = ~x0. So we conclude that A(P ) has full
column rank.
We can now prove Theorem 1.
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we suppose all links
in L+ and L are distinguishable from each other. Otherwise,
we merge each group of indistinguishable links to a single
logical link. The performance number of the logical link is
the sum of its member links.
Let ~x+ denote the ground-truth performance numbers of
the links in L+. ~x+ is a column vector of length jL+j. The
k-th element of ~x+ corresponds to the k-th column of A+.
As A+ correctly captures the relationships between ~x+ and
the external observations ~y, ~y = A+()  ~x+, 8  P .
Therefore, System 3 can be expressed as
A+()  ~x+ = A()  ~x; (10)
where ~x are unknown variables.
We first prove that the condition is sufficient:
On the one hand,A+() includes all the columns ofA():
the column of A() corresponding to neutral (resp. non-
neutral) link l is the same with the column of A+() cor-
responding to l+ (resp. ). On the other hand, when there
exists at least one virtual link l+(n) 2 L+ that is distinguish-
able from any links in L (n must not equal n), the column
ofA+() corresponding to l+(n), denoted by a+(n), is not
in A(). Let  = P . According to Lemma 4, A+(P )
and A(P ) have full column rank, so a+(n) is not in the
column space ofA(P ).
As n 6= n, the performance number of l+(n), x(n)  
x(n) 6= 0. Hence,A+(P )  ~x+ is not in the column space
ofA(P ), i.e., (10) does not have solution when  = P .
Therefore, there always exists a set of pathsets  = P ,
such that when there exists a virtual link l+(n) satisfying the
condition, System 3 is unsolvable, i.e., the network’s neutral-
ity violation is observable.
Second, we show that the condition is necessary by con-
tradiction:
If the condition does not hold, i.e., any virtual link in L+
are indistinguishable from some link in L, then A+() =
A() for any   P . In this case, it is obvious that (10)
would be solvable for any   P , and thus System 3 is
always solvable.
Therefore, the network’s neutrality violation is unobserv-
able when the condition does not hold.
Construct System 4 for 
Here is how to construct System 4 for .
1. We form a special set of pathsets  as follows:
(a) We identify all path pairs pi; pj 2 P such that
Links(pi) \ Links(pj) = .
(b) For each such path pair pi; pj , we add fpig, fpjg,
fpi; pjg to .
2. Let P = [2. We map the sub-graph ofG, which
consists of all the paths in P, to a network slice G =
(N;L;P) as follows:
(a) Link sequence  is mapped to a single link in L.
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(b) 8pi 2 P, i = Links(pi) n , which is the set of
all links in pi outside , is mapped to a single link
in L.
(c) Any path pi 2 P is still an end-to-end path in G.
In fact, G is a logical tree with two levels. The logical
link corresponding to  is in the first level and others are
in the second level. In G, any pi 2 P consists of two
logical links corresponding to  and i respectively.
3. We form a system of equations ~y = A()  ~x, where
(a) ~y = fyiji = 1::jjg is the vector of performance
numbers of the pathsets in, which is the external
observations.
(b) ~x = fx0 j0 = ; or 0 = i (8pi 2 P)g is
the vector of the performance number of the logical
links in G.
(c) A() is the routing matrix of  in G.
Proof of Lemma 2
PROOF. We prove the conclusion by showing that if  is
neutral, System 4 is solvable.
Suppose  is neutral, we construct a special ~x = ~x0 as fol-
lows, where xk (or xk(n)) are the ground-truth performance
numbers of link lk:
1. Let x =
P
lk2 xk.
2. 8pi 2 P \ cn, n = 1::jCj, let xi =
P
lk2i\Ln xk +P
lk2i\Ln xk(n).
We show that ~x0 is always one solution of System 4. Ac-
tually, for any i 2 :
1. If i = fpjg, the corresponding equation in (4) is
yi = x + xj : (11)
yi is the external observation of i in the original net-
work G, suppose pj 2 cn, then the left hand side of
(11) isX
lk2
xk +
X
lk2j\Ln
xk +
X
lk2j\Ln
xk(n):
Clearly, ~x0 is a solution of (11).
2. If i = fpj1; pj2g, the corresponding equation in (4) is
yi = x + xj1 + xj2 : (12)
Suppose pj1 2 cn, pj2 2 cm, as pj1 \ pj2 = , the left
hand side of (12) isX
lk2
xk +
X
lk2j1\Ln
xk +
X
lk2j1\Ln
xk(n)
+
X
lk2j2\Ln
xk +
X
lk2j2\Ln
xk(m):
We can verify that ~x0 is also a solution of (12).
It is therefore that ~x0 is a solution of every equation of Sys-
tem 4, and hence it is a solution of System 4.
When  is neutral, System 4 has a solution ~x0. In other
words, if System 4 is unsolvable,  is non-neutral.
Proof of Lemma 3
PROOF. For any path pair  = fpi; pjg 2 , we ob-
tain a sub-system of System 4 that consists of the equations
corresponding to fpig, fpjg and :
fpig : yi = x + xi
fpjg : yj = x + xi
 : y = x + xi + xj :
(13)
The unique solution of x in (13) is
x = yi + yj   y: (14)
Let x^0(n) denote the ground-truth performance number
of 0 for cn 2 C, 80  L; n = 1::jCj. Then
x^0(n) =
X
lk20\Ln
xk +
X
lk20\Ln
xk(n) (15)
If 0 is neutral, 0 \ Ln = ;, then x^0(n) =
P
lk20\Ln xk
for any n = 1::jCj. For any path p 2 cn, its performance
number is
y = x^(n) + x^(n): (16)
When   cn, i.e., pi and pj are in the same class, we
have
y = x^(n) + x^i(n) + x^j (n): (17)
Substituting (16)(p = pi; pj) and (17) to (14), we have
x = x^(n): (18)
When pi and pj are in different classes, without loss of
generality, we suppose pi 2 cn, pj 2 cm (n 6= m). Then,
with the aid of equivalent neutral network, we have
y =
X
lk2\Ln
xk +
X
lk2\Ln
xk(n
)
+
X
lk2\Ln
(xk(n)  xk(n)) +
X
lk2\Ln
(xk(m)  xk(n))
+ x^i(n) + x^j (m)
= x^(n
) + (x^(n)  x^(n)) + (x^(m)  x^(n))
+ x^i(n) + x^j (m):
(19)
Substituting (16)(p = pi; pj) and (19) to (14), we have
x = x^(n
): (20)
When the condition is satisfied, j 6 cn implies that ei-
ther (a): j  cm 6=n or (b): the paths in j are not in the
same class. In case (a), according to (18), the estimates of
of x obtained from i and j are x^(n) and x^(m) respec-
tively. In case (b), according to (18) and (20), the estimates
of of x obtained from i and j are x^(n) and x^(n) re-
spectively. As n 6= n and n 6= m, two estimates of x are
always different.
Therefore, we get different solutions of x from different
sets of equations of System 4, each of which is unique in the
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corresponding sub-system. System 4 is unsolvable and thus
 is identifiable.
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